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Stuck in the Middle? Indian South Africans in South Africa’s fading rainbow.  
 
Abstract 
This article examines the political and economic position of Indians in post-apartheid South Africa, 
where they are sandwiched between an economically dominant white class and the majority African 
population. It provides a brief background on African and Indian relations since the nineteenth century, 
and examines how and why these were strained at certain historical junctures. Against this background, 
the article explores issues of identity, nationality and citizenship in the post-apartheid period, which has 
seen the population of Indian South Africans augmented by new migrants from the Indian sub-
continent. It argues that while the rubric of ‘Indian’ has been challenged by increasing class divides and 
fracturing along religious lines, the legal definition of South Africans according to race and Indians’ 
relatively privileged position vis-a-vis Africans has seen them come under pressure in a context of 
widening inequality and a racially exclusive African nationalism. They will remain ‘stuck in the middle’ 
for the foreseeable future. 
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Introduction 
In early August 2016, newspaper placards around Durban proclaimed, “Indians benefited from apartheid”. 
Economist Siphamandla Mkhwanzi claimed that “being less oppressed during apartheid has worked to the 
relative advantage of Indians.” Between 1996 and 2014, Indians’ average per capita income increased by 
468%, the fastest growth rate of any racial group. For every R1 earned by a white person, a Black person 
earned 13 cents and an Indian 51 cents. Economist Bonke Dumisa said that this discrepancy “was a 
sensitive issue that must be discussed; however … if one tried to raise the issue, you are branded a racist.” 
In the same article, economist, Dawie Roodt, added that Indians “have relatively few kids and old people. 
The number with qualifications has skyrocketed and unemployment is falling. It is a sweet time for 
Indians.” Roodt, a white Afrikaner, argued that Indians should not benefit from Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) policies (Daily News 11 August 2016).  
 
This report led to a spate of angry responses by Indians, mainly in the form of letters to the press, most of 
which had a similar narrative. They pointed to the humble origins of the indentured, and stressed that their 
economic progress was due to hard work. The writers added that such assertions were creating racial 
tension, and deflecting attention from whites who remained the dominant economic class. This debate 
indicates the continuing resilience of racial categories as a litmus test to judge economic success. At the 
same time, the letters to the newspaper reflect a defensive posture which points to the suffering of Indians 
under colonialism and apartheid, while also highlighting pride in success and the stereotypical tropes of the 
‘model minority’ that works hard, has impeccable family values and invests in their children’s future 
through education.  
 
The economists’ views were not the first instance of Indians being put under a microscope. During the 
Jacob Zuma presidency, South African politics has been dominated by headlines about the relationship 
between the president and Indian South African businessmen as well as with the Gupta family, recent 
migrants from India, which led to the coining of the word ‘Zupta’ to refer to this association. Allegations 
of ‘state capture’ by the Guptas are regularly made by Zuma’s critics. The publicity about Indian 
‘achievements’ and questionable relationships with the president brought into public debate not only the 
role of local Indian capital, but more generally Indian South Africans’ role in the country’s political 
economy.  
 
In choosing the title ‘Stuck in the Middle’ we seek to address whether Indians and Africans fall under 
the rubric ‘Black’ in the post-apartheid period and should be treated equally, or whether there is justification 
for disaggregating Black into Indian, Coloured, and African. In addressing these questions, this article 
engages in the broader debate on how racial regimes are constructed and sustained, and how states 
attempt to address historical imbalances. It examines both the politics of the state as well as the actions 
and attitudes of racialised groups. More specifically, we probe how access to things like housing, 
unskilled jobs, places at universities, and so on, continue to have a racial tinge in the post-apartheid era, 
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and whether the Indian merchant class, frustrated in its attempts to turn itself into a bourgeoisie under 
apartheid, can finally break into the upper echelons of the economy where old white monopoly capital 
still dominates.  
 
In terms of sources, this article makes use of secondary work for the historical background, while the 
construction of the contemporary period relies on official reports and more especially on newspapers.  
Key concepts in this article include race, nation, identity and citizenship. During the Mandela presidency 
there was a deliberate attempt to foster what came to be called the ‘rainbow nation’ as an antidote to the 
racial boundaries fostered by apartheid. But at the same time the post-apartheid state continued to use 
apartheid categories as a basis for affirmative action – Black African, Indian / Asian, Coloured, and white. 
Initially, Coloureds and Indians were spoken off under the umbrella term ‘Black’, but Black Africans is 
now defined as the group that was most oppressed under apartheid and therefore the one that should be the 
pre-eminent beneficiary of redress. For the purposes of polices like BEE and affirmative action, Coloureds 
and Indians were eligible for redress ahead of whites, but this is now under pressure from certain Black 
African (henceforth African) interest groups.   
 
Middlemen Minorities 
The theoretical construct that informs this article is the notion of middleman minorities, a perspective 
that, when doing our doctoral studies in the 1980s and 1990s, we tended to discredit as we were keen 
to incorporate Marxist perspectives. However, our analyses and observations of the past two decades 
suggest that the idea of the middleman minority has resonance for Indian South Africans. The notion 
generally refers to groups placed between dominant and subordinate groups, in this case a politically 
and economically powerful white minority and the majority African population. The literature refers to 
a number of ethnic / racial groups that have occupied such a position in the social structure. Rinder 
(1958), for example, cites the Armenians in Turkey, Parsis in India, and the Chinese in the Pacific. 
Other social scientists speak of the middleman role of Koreans in the United States and the Asians of 
East Africa (Oonk 2015). Oonk (2015, vii) notes that in most histories of Africa, Indians “are mostly 
referred to as ‘middlemen’ or ‘in between’ figures. More often than not, their role is problematized; 
they are seen as exploiters who exploited Africans and supported the colonial rulers and are said to have 
extracted profits from the national economy, instead of in it.” 
 
According to Blalock (1967, 79-84), middleman groups are distinguished by their economic role. They 
occupy an intermediate role in certain occupations, mainly trade and commerce, but also as labour 
contractors, rent collectors, money lenders, and brokers. They play the role of middleman between 
producer and consumer, employer and employee, owner and renter, elite and masses. In her classic 
study of middleman minorities, Bonacich (1973) describes middleman minorities as sojourners who 
believe they will return to their country of origin, are detached from the host society, use in-group labour 
to cut costs, threaten the labour power of majority groups, and are viewed with suspicion for not hiring 
outside labour or investing outside their communities. 
 
Rinder argues that middleman groups arise in societies where there is a “status gap”, which he defines 
as “the discontinuity, the yawning social void which occurs when superior and subordinate positions 
are not bridged by continuous, intermediate degrees of status.” (Rinder 1958, 254). Groups in the status 
gap are scapegoats par excellence because they possess the important scapegoat feature of visibility, as 
they are usually in close proximity to subordinate majority groups, rendering them vulnerable. Their 
role easily becomes that of “economic villain” in times of economic crisis. For “victims of adversity it 
is at least some comfort to explain their misfortune by attributing it to the evil machinations of villains 
rather than as a consequence of remote, complex and hardly comprehensible forces” (Rinder 1958, 
257).  The presence of scapegoats allows hostility to be deflected away from the superior status group: 
“this is the classical function of the scapegoat, to attract and drain off in lightening-rod fashion, the 
hostility which might otherwise be more accurately directed toward different targets” (Rinder 1958-9, 
258).  
 
In colonial and apartheid South Africa, Indians came to play a classic middleman role, with some 
qualification of the standard understanding of middlemen minorities. The majority arrived as working 
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class migrants under indenture and for many decades were amongst the poorest of urban residents. 
Furthermore, the policies of successive white minority regimes segregated Indians residentially and 
confined them to areas of the economy where they were placed in perpetual competition with Africans 
as workers and aspiring bourgeoisie. Most Indian South Africans chose to become settlers and aspired 
to be citizens, but this was resisted for a long time by white minority regimes and is under stress in the 
post-apartheid period. 
 
To examine the place and role of Indians in South Africa at the present time, it is necessary to take a longer 
view. How were Africans and Indians incorporated into the colonial economy? What was the relationship 
between these subaltern groups during the era of white minority rule, and what was their relationship to 
successive white minority regimes? This article therefore discusses the differential incorporation of 
Africans and Indians in the colonial, and later apartheid economy and the consequences thereof, and 
thereafter examines how this inheritance is playing out in the present.  
 
Colonial period, 1860-1910: Racialising difference 
 
Indians began arriving in the then colony of Natal as indentured migrants from 1860 and as free migrants 
from the 1870s. Within two decades of their arrival, Indian traders faced hostility from white settlers. 
Once Natal achieved Responsible Government in 1893, the authorities passed laws that made it near 
impossible for non-indentured Indians to gain entry, and very difficult for those already resident to vote, 
acquire trading licenses, or enter schools and professions. The then Prime Minister of Natal, Harry 
Escombe, stated emphatically in 1897, that whites “cannot afford to have the competition which now 
exists between the Asiatic trader and the European trader” (Vahed and Bhana 2015, 62-64).  
 
The arrival of Indians also created competition and conflict over land and labour with Africans. Indian 
labour undercut Africans’ refusal to work the white man’s land; employers placed Africans in positions 
of authority over Indians and used Africans to ‘discipline’ Indian workers; and many Africans were 
angry that agricultural land was made available to Indians while there were land shortages in the 
reserves that the colonial authorities had set aside for African occupation (Meer 1985). African leader 
Dr John Dube, who built the Ohlange Settlement in close proximity to Gandhi’s Phoenix Settlement, 
stated in the early twentieth-century that “people like the Coolies have come to our land and lord it over 
us, as though we, who belong to the country, were mere nonentities” (in Rajab 2014). Bhana and Vahed 
(2005, 26) show that in the late nineteenth-century Indians and Africans mainly came into contact as 
“employers and workers, landlords and tenants, and buyers and sellers” with “little by way of 
assimilation of Indians into African society and vice versa.” Over time, “racial tensions emerged and 
officials and employers alike exploited them for their own ends.”  
 
Effectively excluded from urban centres, Indian traders set up shop in locations that serviced Indian and 
African communities. They not only dominated small trade, but also monopolised transport and were 
involved in shack renting to Africans. Padayachee and Morrell point out that, because of the lack of 
“white competition for Indian and African custom … the post-1914 Indian commercial sector … was 
handed an artificially protected market in the racially segmented African and Indian retail and wholesale 
trade, especially in Natal” (1991: 102). In the “protected market” that Padayachee and Morrell refer to, 
Indian traders sought to protect their monopoly against Africans as the latter began to make their 
presence felt in the urban setting. Thus, for example, in 1930 an Indian Bus Owners’ Association was 
set up with one white and 104 Indian bus owners. No Africans were members. Just four buses in Durban 
were owned by Africans (Torr 1985, 8). The Association vigorously opposed attempts by Africans to 
obtain licenses to operate buses, leading to much hostility. The superintendent at the African township 
of Lamontville warned in 1948, that “the native population were now becoming openly hostile to the 
Indian bus drivers who entered the location” (Torr 1985, 8).   
 
In March 1947, Dr Yusuf Dadoo of the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) and Dr Monty Naicker of the 
Natal Indian Congress (NIC) signed a joint declaration of co-operation, known as the Doctors’ Pact, 
with Dr A.B. Xuma, president-general of the African National Congress (ANC), pledging “the fullest 
co-operation between the African and Indian peoples.” The ANC leadership in Natal opposed the pact. 
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One of its executive members, Selby Msimang, warned that the pact “had done nothing to foster the 
spirit of cooperation” and was contrary to “the universal feeling of the Africans in this Province” (in 
Vahed 1995, 256). Just two years later in 1949, Msimang’s warning came to fruition as Afro-Indian 
riots consumed the streets of Durban. Three days of bloody confrontations left 142 people dead and 
1,087 injured. NIC and ANC leaders argued that the riots were incited by “third force” elements so that 
the new National Party (NP) government could justify dividing South Africans by race. This ignores 
the competition for limited material resources between Indians and Africans in a racialised city, which 
the policies of the white state deepened as it suited its agenda of racialised politics (Desai and Vahed 
2010, 232-254). 
 
While whites controlled political and economic power in the city, Africans lived in close proximity to 
Indians and often competed directly with them in the economy, and saw them as standing in their path 
to upward mobility. According to evidence by African witnesses before the 1949 Riots Commission, 
their principal grievances included overcharging by Indian traders, the ill-treatment of Africans on 
Indian-owned busses, so-called “loose” relations between African women and Indian men, the high 
rentals charged by Indian shack-lords, and general economic competition between African and Indian, 
which included retail trade and bus routes (Vahed 1995,259).  
 
The Apartheid state 
 
The coming to power of the NP in 1948 saw the inauguration of volkskapitalisme, or people’s 
capitalism. An Afrikaner bourgeoisie was nurtured by the state. As Nattrass and Seekings (2010, 5) 
point out, the apartheid state “used its considerable powers of regulation to promote Afrikaner capital, 
to protect the living standards of white voters, and to promote domestic industry.” A myriad of 
“measures consolidated rigid racial boundaries in the occupation and use of space.” The 1950 Group 
Areas Act was used to drive Indian traders out of the cities, to be replaced in many cases by emerging 
Afrikaner merchants. According to O’Meara (1996, 79), “the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut was obsessed 
with the ‘menace’ of Indian traders.”   
 
Despite the racist vitriol directed against the Indian merchant class in particular, after South Africa 
became a republic in 1961, the state recognised that Indians were a permanent part of the population 
and withdrew the threat to repatriate them. Instead, measures were enacted to co-opt them. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, Indian merchants used state created bodies like the South African Indian Council (SAIC), 
established in 1964, to relax trading restrictions. In 1978, a member of the SAIC Executive admitted 
that a lot of their time was taken up with “the opening of the central business districts in various towns 
and cities and the resettlement of traders and building complexes” (SAIC minutes, 1 (13), 1978, 194). 
There was no fundamental change in the apartheid government’s approach. Some SAIC members 
secured concessions in the shipping and transport industries, but city centres and the financial and 
mining sectors remained the preserve of white capital. Despite racialised boundaries, Indians began to 
accumulate capital through family owned businesses, mainly in the clothing and textile industries and 
retail trade (Freund 1995, 78-82). As petty apartheid crumbled, they were well placed to take advantage 
of offers of petrol stations and the construction of high rise flats in Indian group areas that brought in 
considerable revenue. 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, increased opportunities for upward mobility came through the expansion 
of schools and compulsory secondary education from 1973, the establishment of the M.L. Sultan 
Technical College and University of Durban-Westville for Indians, and the places afforded to medical 
students at the University of Natal (Vahed and Waetjen 2015, 280-290). These new graduates, many of 
whom took advantage of the erosion of bans on inter-provincial travel and residence restrictions in the 
economic heartland, Johannesburg, found jobs as professionals. The Technikon graduated skilled 
workers, especially in the building and engineering trades (Freund 1995, 84). The education sector and 
civil servants in government-created bodies constituted the core of the new Indian middle class.  
 
The working class benefited from the employment of large numbers of women, particularly in the 
clothing and textile industries. By 1980, 53% of Indian employment in the Durban-Pinetown region 
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was in manufacturing. They made important economic advances through their trade union, the Garment 
Workers Industrial Union (Freund 1995, 78). The dreaded Group Areas Act resulted in thousands being 
herded into Indians-only townships like Chatsworth to the south of Durban and Phoenix to the north. 
While a callous act on the part of the state, many Indians moved from shacks without running water 
and electricity, to brick houses with these services that they expanded and improved over the decades 
(see Desai and Vahed 2013, 19-30).  
 
These changes in housing and education, and new work opportunities were reflected in the economic 
gap that developed between Indians and Africans. In 1984, 42% of working Indians earned above 
R16 000 per annum. While this did not compare favourably with the 83% of whites, only 5% of Africans 
were in this income bracket. On the other end of the scale, while 13% of Indians earned under R5 000 
per annum, the figure for Africans was 62% (Freund 1995, 90). 
 
With the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990 and elimination of all restrictions based on 
race as South Africa achieved African majority rule, how did the Indian rich respond?  
 
Zuptanomics 
 
Political change coincided with important changes amongst Indians. Many of the old big Indian family 
businesses started to implode. A new generation of professionals, building nuclear families, displayed 
declining interest in extended family businesses, preferring to cash in their largesse and go their separate 
ways. These companies included the Pietermaritzburg-based Willowton Oil and Cake Mills; the Patel 
family’s tyre and fuel group Royal Vulcanising; and Tongaat Rice Mills. At the same time, a new coterie 
of Indian business interests emerged representing new domestic Indian capital as well as recent arrivals 
from India, who sought to use political connections so long denied during apartheid, to enter the 
gambling, mining and state tender sectors. In this, they were aided by the way in which the ANC 
approached the economy. Justified as a measure to attract investment, the ANC beat a quick retreat 
from “the Freedom Charter’s promise to nationalise banks, mines and monopolies” (Bundy 2014, 33).  
 
This did not mean that it would be business as usual. The BEE policy was promulgated to act as a Trojan 
horse in challenging white monopoly capital. In practical terms, it was intended to nurture a black 
bourgeoisie. Then president Thabo Mbeki stated that “as part of the realisation of the aim to eradicate 
racism in our country, we must strive to strengthen a black capitalist class ... whose presence within our 
economy and society will be part of the process of the deracialisation of the economy and society” 
(Macdonald 2004, 648). According to MacDonald (2004, 647-88), the ANC was  
following the time-honoured custom of building a bourgeoisie for the good of the people. Some of 
the means the NP used to build the Afrikaner bourgeoisie were notorious … but boosted Afrikaner-
owned businesses through state contracts, subsidies, jawboning, and pressure on English speaking 
capital to sell subsidiaries to Afrikaners. By similar means, for similar reasons, the ANC is building 
an African bourgeoisie.  
 
While many old family businesses broke up during the late apartheid period as children pursued 
professional careers, others sought to turn themselves into a fully-fledged bourgeoisie. With the demise 
of racial restrictions, once forbidden opportunities would afford themselves.  One avenue for the Indian 
merchant class was partnerships with dominant white monopoly capital keen to nurture Black 
empowerment relationships as a way to mitigate racial antagonism. However, in the main, white 
monopoly capital sought partnerships with Africans who were leading members of the ruling ANC.  
 
The way the settlement played out meant that the commanding heights of the economy remained in the 
hands of white monopoly capital and the Indian merchant class was not strong enough to challenge 
them. Indian capital also lacked the international links that could afford them the necessary leverage to 
take on white capital.  The lack of international connections was mainly the result of the leading role 
India played in ensuring the isolation of apartheid South Africa. As apartheid fell, businesses from the 
Indian sub-continent were slower than their northern counterparts in seeking investment opportunities 
as the latter had never really left in substantial numbers despite the disinvestment campaign.   In this 
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context, some in the local Indian merchant class sought to develop direct political connections with 
leading members of the ANC. This was facilitated by the fact that some could call on their anti-apartheid 
credentials. The rationale was that they could feed off state contracts, especially through state owned 
enterprises which handled contracts worth billions of rands. Here, they were largely shielded from 
competition by white capital that dominated the private economy and prioritised the dropping of 
exchange controls to spread their tentacles globally.  
 
One of the first examples of Indians using political connections was Shabir Shaik.      
 
Zuma’s relationship with Shaik occupied headlines for almost a decade. Initially, the controversy 
centred on South Africa’s notorious arms deal that unfolded in the late 1990s. Zuma was accused of 
accepting money from Shaik and  from an arms company. There were 783 charges of fraud, corruption 
and racketeering against Zuma. After many delaying tactics by Zuma’s legal team, the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) dropped the charges in April 2009 on the grounds of ‘political 
interference’ by Zuma’s predecessor, Thabo Mbeki. The Democratic Alliance (DA), the official 
opposition to the ruling ANC party, challenged the decision in court and eventually, in April 2016, the 
North Gauteng High Court declared the NPA’s decision to discontinue prosecution of Zuma invalid. 
The NPA has appealed this ruling (de Vos 2016), 
 
Shaik was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment but granted parole in March 2009 when doctors told the 
medical parole advisory board that he was “terminally ill”. He had served 28 months in prison. Shaik 
seems to have recovered well; early on, there were sporadic reports of him playing golf. Judging by the 
many letters to editors, the public was convinced that political connections were used to obtain his 
parole. This incident fuelled the Indian businessmen’s reputation as “slippery”.  
 
There are many threads to Zuma’s Indian connections and these allegiances have proffered lucrative 
benefits. Other close relationships include those with security tycoon and racehorse owner Roy 
Moodley and Vivian Reddy of Edison Power, both of whom secured state tenders worth hundreds of 
millions of rands over the years. It is alleged that a R1.25-billion contract awarded in August 2012 to 
supply ‘smart’ electricity meters in Johannesburg was ‘manipulated’ in favour of Reddy’s company, 
even though there were cheaper bids. Reddy also claimed that he had lent money to Zuma in 2003 to 
fund the upgrade of his Nkandla homestead (Faull and Sole 2013).  
 
An August 2016 report stated that R550 million was paid by IT security company, Siyangena 
Technologies, to Hail Way Trading, whose only director was Moodley. Siyangena had secured 
‘disputed contracts’ valued at R4 billion from the Passenger Rail Agency of SA (Prasa). Public Protector 
Thuli Madonsela found in 2015 that the contract awarded to Siyangena was “improperly extended 
beyond the original scope of the tender.” Zuma spoke at Moodley's extravagant birthday party in Durban 
in 2014, extolling the latter’s contribution to the ANC. Leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), 
Julius Malema stated that Moodley supported Zuma financially after he was dismissed as deputy 
president of the country in 2005, due to his legal battles, and that he received payments four months 
into his presidency. In 2012, when the court sought to attach the luxury vehicle of Zuma’s son Edward 
for outstanding debts, the car was found to be registered in Moodley’s name (Myburgh 2016).  
 
While others, such as film-maker Anant Singh, have also been accused of using political connections 
to secure economic deals and amass wealth, for our purposes, Shaik, Moodley and Reddy’s links suffice. 
However, compared to the wealth amassed by the Gupta family, these businessmen are in the ‘minor 
league’.  Their involvement with Zuma resulted in a new word, Zupta, being coined which has become 
part of normal-speak in the country’s conversation and has come to signify that President Zuma and his 
family sit atop a corrupt consortium and that their main corrupters are the Gupta family. 
 
The Gupta’s have used the space created by BEE with incredible success. They arrived from India in 
1993 and established an IT company, Sahara Computers, but are now involved in industries ranging 
from mining to media. They literally zoomed into the consciousness of South Africans in April 2013 
when they were allowed the use of the South African Air Force Base at Waterkloof to land a plane load 
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of 217 guests from India who were attending a family wedding (Mataboge 2013). The South African 
media dubbed the incident ‘Guptagate’ and public sentiment began to stiffen against the closely bonded 
families. It is alleged that the Guptas even influence South African cabinet appointments. The most 
public of these accusations was by then Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, who alleged that he 
was offered a ministerial position by the Guptas preceding the dismissal of then Finance Minister 
Nhlenhle Nene in December 2015. Jonas rejected the offer and Zuma appointed Des Van Rooyen as 
Finance Minister. This unfolding saga proved disastrous as billions were wiped off the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) and Zuma was forced to backtrack and replace his appointee with former Finance 
Minister Pravin Gordhan (Mail & Guardian 16 March 2016) who, in turn, was dismissed from his 
position in March 2017, allegedly at the behest of the Guptas.  
 
The Guptas’ influence and reach into South African society is deep, to the extent that the term ‘state 
capture’ became part of South African everyday political language. Public Protector Thuli Madonsela 
conducted an investigation into allegations of state capture and released her report on the eve of her 
departure from office in October 2016.  The Report stated that the family was involved in shady mining 
deals in coal, uranium, gold, platinum, diamonds, and iron ore. They allegedly benefited from official 
connections to secure lucrative state contracts and private loans (Madonsela 2016).  
 
Running through all this is the subliminal narrative that every now and again emerges into the open; 
Indians controlling the President. EFF deputy leader Floyd Shivambu stated that the Guptas “have de 
facto colonised South Africa, with Zuma being the chief colonial administrator” (Malala 2016). 
Seasoned media columnist Fred Khumalo wrote sarcastically in response to allegations that President 
Zuma’s son, Duduzane, had cut a shady deal with Indian businessmen: 
The media should be commending poor Duduzane for being a fast learner: he realised that his good 
father became quite a comfortable man thanks to his friendship with Schabir Shaik, who just so 
happens to be an Indian and a businessman. So Duduzane figured: ah, let me get myself my own 
Indian as well. This was nothing new, an Indian businessman finding a politically powerful darkie 
or vice versa (Sunday Times 24 October 2010).  
 
In response to the actions of Shaik, Reddy, Moodley and the Guptas, Kalim Rajab (2014), occasional 
columnist, wrote: 
It pains me to remember what heartbreak the actions of Schabir Shaik, Mac Maharaj and Mo Shaik 
wrought on the first decade of our democratic nation. It pains me to see that when President Zuma 
says, “I’ve always said a wise businessman supports the ANC... you can support... [and] your 
business will multiply”, the most visible expression of this brand of blatant cronyism appears to be 
Vivien Reddy, who has won numerous tenders not awarded through the usual processes. And it pains 
many of us to find out that the president’s son Edward, who has recently begun coming into 
politically connected deals, has had his house and much of his assets “bought” by Roy Moodley, 
another Indian accused of benefitting from dodgy empowerment deals. All of these, and several 
other, very powerful men … espouse a venal brand of insider wealth accumulation so at odds with 
the vision upon which our new democracy was advocated - and it is this reality which pushes people 
like Mfeka [discussed below] to react in the way that they have. So as much as I dislike his crude 
stereotyping, his words force us to confront some harsh truths.  
 
Hostility directed against Indians is not limited to those few individuals who are seen to benefit from 
their relationship with the state. More generally, the public discourse among Africanists is that Indians 
as a whole benefited during the period of apartheid and are now benefiting under the guise of BEE.  
 
The fading rainbow 
 
In South Africa’s first non-racial elections in April 1994, approximately two-thirds of Indians voted for 
the former white NP. This support was largely based on class lines, with the majority of the working 
class in Chatsworth and Phoenix voting for this party, reflecting concern about the impact of African 
majority rule, including the loss of jobs as a result of affirmative action. This voting trend was replicated 
in 1999, but larger numbers of Indians voted for the ruling party in 2004. However, in subsequent 
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elections, the ‘Indian vote’ has been distributed amongst the parties, with large numbers voting for the 
DA, which evolved from the former NP and the Progressive Federal Party. Part of the explanation for 
Indian ambivalence towards the ANC is the historically uneasy relationship between Africans and 
Indians, with violence spilling into the public sphere in 1949 and again in 1985 when the settlement 
established by Mohandas K. Gandhi in Phoenix was attacked. While the dominant thread of the 
liberation narrative is non-racial unity, Indo-Africans tensions persist.  
 
In 2002, playwright Mbongeni Ngema released a song in Zulu entitled “AmaNdiya” (“Indian”), which 
criticised Indians for their alleged unwillingness to accept Africans as equals, resisting the changing 
political and economic order, voting for white leaders, exploiting Africans as workers and customers, 
and for not investing in the townships. He also protested the large numbers of post-apartheid arrivals 
from the Indian sub-continent. Ngema urged the “strong men” of the Zulu “nation” to stand up against 
Indians. Amongst the song’s lyrics was that “Indians are abusive to Black people, being more racist 
than Whites” (Bhana and Vahed 2005, 150). The Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa 
(BCCSA) ruled in June 2002 that the song amounted to “racial hate speech with incitement to harm” 
and banned it from airplay. As Baines (2009: 54) points out, censorship cannot “mask the deep fault 
lines in the society that have been manifest in the particularism of identity politics.” Ngema responded 
to criticism by stating that the song spoke “to the masses of Africans who fought and died for this 
country - and to this day they have not obtained their freedom. With 70% of Durban Unicity jobs 
occupied by Indians, Africans in the province were expressing their sense of exclusion by asking 
themselves ‘why did we vote?”’ (Farquhar 2002). 
 
Ngema raised important questions about citizenship, nationality and identity. Did Indians belong to the 
new South Africa and were they, in fact, committed to it? His song implies that Indians are not 
indigenous to the soil and therefore not entitled to make the same claims as Africans. He defined 
nationality in strictly racial terms. Indians and other foreigners are periodically attacked and blamed for 
what in essence is the failure of South Africa’s economic policies, which have led to large-scale 
unemployment and massive inequality.  
 
One of the issues that Ngema touched on was the question of post-apartheid migrants from India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. While there are no exact figures, they number in the hundreds of thousands 
and run grocery stores, spaza shops, barber shops, food stores, and electronic and cellphone stores.  
Many have set up shops in African areas or on the boundaries of these areas. This has led to periodic 
attacks by local Africans who argue that they have forced local small shops out of business.  
 
South Africa is one of the most “consistently” unequal societies in the world, with a gini co-efficient, 
which measures inequality within societies, ranging between 0.660 and 0.696 over the past decade 
(Bhorat 2015). An analysis of Census 2011 shows that average annual household income for Africans 
was R60 613 while that for Indians stood at four times that amount, at R251 541. The average household 
income for whites was R365 134. Several factors explain this difference, such as the fact that Indians 
are predominantly urban while large numbers of Africans are rural; the younger African population; 
larger size of African families, and so on. But most ordinary people are not interested in such ‘academic’ 
explanations; their concern is the stark differences in income levels. Unemployment levels are also 
higher for Africans. Differences in income levels are also an indication of the higher levels of education 
amongst Indians, which is a legacy of apartheid. Figures released by Statistics South Africa (StatSA) in 
September 2014, showed that 53% of the employed Indian workforce was skilled (up from 25% in 
1994) while the figures for Africans reflected little change, 17% in 2014 as opposed to 15% in 1994. 
Over this 20-year period, unemployment among Black Africans with tertiary education increased from 
8% to 19%. Overall, 28.6% of Africans were unemployed while the figure for Indians was 11.8% and 
that for whites was 7.3%. While Africans accounted for 79.3% of the working age population in 2014, 
they made up 73% of the employed, 85.7% of the unemployed and 83.3% of the population not 
economically active. The absorption rate into the labour market in 2014 stood at 52.5% for Indians and 
39.2% for Africans (BusinessTech 2015). 
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In this context, relations between Indians and Africans remain delicately balanced, with African ire 
every so often directed at Indians. The immediate question is why anger is directed at Indians and not 
whites? Part of the answer lies in the history of relations between the two communities. Indians 
monopolised trade with Africans, often acted as landlords and dominated ownership of busses used by 
Africans. This led to periodic tension. In post-apartheid South Africa, the old Group Areas remain 
largely intact, with African and Indian areas contiguous to each other. Indians and Africans jostle with 
one another on transport routes; compete for jobs at the lower ends of the occupational hierarchy and, 
to borrow from the relative deprivation theorists, their close proximity leads to comparisons by Africans 
to those across the road.  Meanwhile, whites are both spatially and economically much more removed 
and largely invisible from the everyday relations that constitute the lives of Indians and Africans.    
 
An African grassroots movement, the Mazibuye African Forum (MAF), has been active over the past 
five years, specifically targeting ‘exploitative’ Indians. Key members are Phumlani Mfeka and Zweli 
Sangweni, who was convicted of armed robbery and released on bail in 2005 after serving 11 years 
behind bars (City Press 19 January 2014). In a newspaper interview they denied being anti-Indian or 
that their agenda was racist. They insisted that they were addressing the “economic marginalisation of 
Africans” (City Press 19 January 2014). According to Sangweni, Indians “benefited through 
colonialism and apartheid…. We do not regard them as Africans but… (as) Indians in the diaspora” 
(Daily News 16 July 2013). Mfeka stated that Africans and Indians fought against the apartheid regime 
for different reasons. While Indians wanted equality with whites, Africans were fighting to regain their 
land (in Rajab 2014). During January 2014, the group called on government not to give tenders to 
Indians and to redistribute Indian-owned land to Africans (City Press 19 January 2014). The MAF 
Economic Quagmire Discussion Paper of 2014, warned that the issue of African economic redress was 
so “inflammatory that if not handled with the diligence it deserves it might very well be a catalyst for 
an undesirable race-economic rooted conflict, particularly in KZN where the African majority has more 
clearly than anywhere else in South Africa been reduced to the role of spectator or labourer in the local 
economy.” Mfeka was not optimistic that violence would not break out (in Rajab 2014).  
 
In the face of criticism that the MAF was fostering race tensions, Sangweni insisted that “rather than 
tone down we will be mobilising Africans on the issues that we have raised” (Daily News 16 July 2013). 
Sangweni criticised a planned statue to commemorate the arrival of indentured Indians in 2010. He 
stated that it would be “a monumental insult” to African leaders like John Dube, King Cetshwayo and 
Bhambatha “who uncompromisingly defended the length and breadth of KwaZulu-Natal” (Daily News 
22 July 2016). The MAF also rejects the suggestion that Gandhi should be respected as an anti-colonial 
figure in South Africa’s history. On the contrary, its “Economic Quagmire Discussion Paper”, prepared 
for discussion at the ANC’s 2012 policy conference, includes a page and a half of criticism of Gandhi’s 
South African years, underscoring his allegedly racist attitude towards Africans. At the bottom of page 
five is a quote from Gandhi in bright red italics: “Ours is one continued struggle sought to be inflicted 
upon us by Europeans, who desire to degrade us to the level of the raw kaffir, whose occupation is 
hunting and whose sole ambition is to collect a certain number of cattle to buy a wife, and then pass his 
life in indolence and nakedness” Mfeka told interviewer Rajab: “Yup, that’s a quote we like to throw 
around. Oh, Gandhi hated us. The guy was very blunt. He really ingrained this racial supremacist ideal 
within the Indian community here” (Rajab, 2014). 
 
In one of its newsletters, the MAF accused Indians of growing economically through “deceit and stealth 
and by exploiting and subjugating African people, including their children” (Daily News 22 July 2016). 
In 2015, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and Ahmed Kathrada Foundation 
made an application to the Equality Court, accusing the MAF, Sangweni and Mfeka of hate speech. The 
MAF had to respond to the allegations by 13 October 2015. The Kathrada Foundation’s director, 
Neeshan Balton, stated that MAF’s “inflammatory remarks … has the potential to ignite racial strife 
and goes against the grain of the ideal of a non-racial and democratic society” and posed a “risk to 
nation-building and democracy.” Balton emphasised that the Foundation was not opposed to debate 
around affirmative action, but given the complexity of race in South African society, “solutions cannot 
be found in the articulation of racial statements or songs that further divide people and undermine social 
cohesion.” The applicants claimed that the MAF was unfairly singling out Indians for “being exploitive 
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and being responsible for the poor economic conditions of Africans”; was distorting the facts to generate 
anti-Indian feelings; and that the MAF held that Indians did not belong to South Africa even though 
most were born in the country (Ahmed Kathrada Foundation 2015).  
 
Magistrate John Saunders proposed in April 2016 that the matter be decided on court papers alone. The 
MAF refused and Sangweni and Mfeka insisted that the matter go to trial. The matter was set before 
the Durban Equality Court in July 2016, but the MAF did not turn up. Magistrate Saunders stated that 
“to say that the court is displeased with the respondent’s conduct is an understatement” (Daily News 22 
July 2016). The case continues.  
 
Stories of Indian economic success and continuing exposé of the Guptas reinforce the ire of 
organisations like the MAF. Indian South Africans are reacting in different ways to rising African 
nationalism and affirmative action policies. Many are angry at being discriminated against under 
apartheid and being subjected to a similar fate post-apartheid. But as Bhorat (2015) points out, the 
playing field was not level in 1994. There were, he argues, unequal 
skewed initial endowments (or assets that people and households have) post-1994 in the form of, for 
example, human capital, access to financial capital, and ownership patterns. All of these served to 
generate a highly unequal growth trajectory, ensuring that those households with these higher levels 
of endowments gained from the little economic growth there was. In addition, we are an economy 
characterised by a growth path which is both skills-intensive and capital-intensive, thus not 
generating a sufficient quantum of low-wage jobs – which is key to both reducing unemployment 
and inequality. 
 
The danger of analysing statistics for so-called monolithic race groups is that it ignores the emergence 
of an African bourgeoisie as well as a growing group of poor and marginalised Indians. For example, 
the gini co-efficient amongst Africans was 0.66 in 2015 which points to massive disparity between rich 
and poor Africans. Redress which has mainly taken on the guise of BEE has not led to redistribution of 
wealth downwards but reinforced a small Black elite.  
 
Conclusion 
Two decades after democracy, there are a few Indians who, by smoking the crony pipe with ANC 
leaders, have turned themselves into chiefs of capital. They do not have the firepower to challenge white 
capital, instead operating as raiding parties on state tenders and enterprises. There are middle class 
Indians who, finding their children’s paths blocked, are responding in all kinds of creative ways, 
including hedging their bets and setting up shop overseas. Then there are the poor, who face a double 
bind. They confront restrictions as Indians, while their class position creates the everyday difficulties 
of survival. Their reaction has been to reach into a deeper Indianness, hanging on to the old Indian 
townships and voting for conservative opposition parties.  
 
The big financial success stories post-1994 have seen Indians look to state tenders and ANC crony 
capitalism as a way to accumulate wealth. Local and foreign Indian capital is in a difficult position, as 
its links with the ANC government come under increased scrutiny and Africans demand to be first in 
the queue for state largesse. Some like the MAF demand that Indians be removed altogether from any 
form of BEE. They also have within their sight the small retail stores and professionals like doctors and 
lawyers operating in former African townships.  
 
It will be interesting to see how Indians respond. Will Indian capital follow white monopoly capital and 
divest to other shores? Some are motivated to acquire Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) or Overseas 
Citizen of India (OCI) status, which the Indian government inaugurated in 1973 as non-resident Indian 
(NRI). The Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government extended NRIs by introducing the PIO card 
in 1998 which made it easier to maintain relations with India and extend that affective link into a 
material one (Brown 2006, 159). Indian South Africans are taking up the offer for different reasons, 
some because they want to invest in India; others to avoid the hassle of applying for a visa each time 
they visit the country; and some because they feel threatened by what they perceive to be growing 
African nationalism. Furthermore, there is a strong sense of Indian racial pride at the achievements of 
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‘shining India’ under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. While remaining in South Africa, many 
financially better off Indians hedge their bets in ways that are not mutually exclusive; seeking PIO status 
while sending their children overseas (to the north) to study in the hope that they will acquire citizenship 
and make a home there.  
 
It would be intellectually short-sighted to characterise those Indians who seek to think of themselves as 
a part of a wider diaspora, or those Indian Muslims who favour being part of a global ummah, as 
backward looking. Having done well over the past two decades, the Indian middle class is at a 
crossroads. Pushed out by monopoly capital in the retail sector, the old, small trader class responded by 
educating their children. They consolidated as professionals, no doubt aided by significant inheritances. 
But their children are finding the paths of their parents increasingly difficult to follow. University places 
are more difficult to access because of racial quotas and many are forced to search for study 
opportunities overseas. Ties with India are thus maintained and encouraged as some sort of ‘insurance’ 
policy.  
 
The Indian merchant class has failed to usurp old white monopoly capital. Family owned businesses 
have splintered rather than move into the commanding heights of the economy. Others have sought to 
use access to the new wielders of state power to accumulate vast wealth. However, this route is shaky, 
as tenders have come under increased scrutiny and African nationalists have mobilised to exclude 
Indians from the feeding trough. On the positive side, Indian South Africans are fully fledged citizens 
of South Africa, the last of the disenfranchised racial groups to be recognised in this way. Until the 
early 1960s the policy of the apartheid state was that they were permanent foreigners and that means 
should be explored to repatriate them. Citizenship affords them protection in terms of a very progressive 
Constitution.  This represents an incredible advance on their position during apartheid. On the other 
hand, there are increasing xenophobic attacks against migrants, including those from the Asian sub-
continent.  
 
In the absence of accelerated redistribution programmes, as inequality deepens and unemployment 
spirals, one can only surmise that Afro-Indian relations are headed for very tense times, lending 
credence to the idea of middlemen minorities as vulnerable during times of majority racial nationalism 
and economic distress.  
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